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CHAPTER I .;.. BACKGROUND 
Importance o:t reliability 
In the United States of America today, the word "reliabilitytt 
is heard more and more often •.. Its usage started in the :field of mili-
tary purchasing, but .. now it has filtered down to the consumer field. 
The questions arise as to what reliability means in this. modem context, 
what reliability should cost, and whether we, as consumers and taxpayers, 
are getting a fair return for our dollar. 
Definitions of reliability have been attempted by nany people. 
<1n:e authority maintains that, ttProduct reliability is the probability of 
a.product performing its intended function over its intended life and 
under the operating conditions encountered.nl A government-industr.r 
_ connnittee has stated that, "Reliability is the probability of performing 
without failure a specified function under given conditions for a speci-
fied period of time. n2 other definitions only repeat the theme of these: 
• . I 
if it works when it's needed, it's reliable. Now, however, this working 
is far more complicated than it was in the days when the Model "A" was 
considered a good buy because it was "reliable. tt 
Today, reliability headlines are most often made in the field 
of guided missles and rockets. The first astronauts and cosmonauts 
,· 
stake their lives on the fact that their vehicles are reliable. Human 
life is not the only factor to ~·onsider, however. In the field of cost, 
millions of dollars ride on each firing. The launching of the first 
.. American manned orbital flight is reckoned to cost approximately $400 
million for development and firing. With an investment of this magni-
ft,u®,, :'f:aiiliu:re .fus ~un~~, ~especially if it can be traced to a part 
or component o£ negligible value. 
Complexity -o£ modern equiplr!ent is another £actor requiring 
reliable products. The modern missile may have over 275',000 parts. 
Failure o£ any o£ these components may cause the missile. to miss the 
target or e~en £ail to get o£f the ground. A comic strip recently 
described a toy missile as:, nso realistic it only ~orks half the time.rt3 
The ring o£ truth to this comic strip remark causes nany system design 
men much loss of sleep. 
The most important reason for the present stress on relia-
bility is that it is now vital to our national survival. In the pre-
sent cold war situation, we have to show potential' aggressors that we 
are prepared constantly to defend ourselves. Our Minuteman missile, 
soon to be one o£ the mainstays of our arsenal, is designed to be in-· 
stalled in its sUo and kept "warmed upn electronically for a period 
of at least three years.4 To achieve this sort o£ operation requires 
the equivalent of running 30,000 television sets contin'UQusly £or one 
year without a single failure. This is an extremely difficult objec-
tive to achieve, yet one on which our national defense now depends. 
Beginnings· o£ Reliability 
·How: did modern reliability· standards begin? They are new to 
the business field, dating from World War II for their beginning~, 
when the first Joint Arm::r Navy- standards were developed. These JAN 
standards led to co-operation between domestic a±rlines after World 
War II in a p:- ogram to develop reliable electron tubes. Finally, 
2 
;,· ... 
govermneiat and industry representatives established in 1952, the Advisory 
Group om. Reliability of Electrorlc Equipmem.t (AGREE). AGREE was divided 
into various sUbcommittees which have made ~eco~endations on ~ phases 
of reliability, some of "Which have been. adopted as part of military purchase 
specificatiOOilS. 
As well as working with the government on a direct basis, the 
electronics industry has set up its own committees on reliability um.der such 
organizations as the Electronics Industry Association, the Joint Electronic 
Devices Committee, the Welded Electranie Packaging Association, the Aircraft 
. . . 
Industries Association, and the American Society for Testing Materials. The 
result 0f this co-operation has been an exchange o.f information which has 
led to improv.ed products through s0me degree o:f standardization and exchange 
of reliabilit~ data. 
Method of Approach 
'Where does reliability as a practice stand today? At the moment, 
it still seems to be a somewhat immatU:repractiee: a field offering gre8;;t 
possibilities,_ the:f'ull potentialities of which have yet to be tapped. This 
study will survey some of the practices now used in the field and give some 
estimate of how effective these practices have been. As mueh as possible, 
the mathematical formulae used in the field will not be mentioned. A 
criticism of these techniques is considered to be beyond the scope of this 
study and beyend the knowledge of its author. 
From any study of a :field must come some opinion of the course 
which should be followed in the :future. This report will include specific 
recommendations :for practices to be followed by both industry and the Defense 
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Department. Reconnnendations, however, have little value unless some 
lmowledge is available of the background from which they were made. 
In the present "state of the art" of reliability development, this 
background is of extremely nebulous character. O:f this nation's 
several missile programs, widely different approaches to reliability 
are being used; of these approaches, only the Minuteman program has 
striven to improve the basic components from which the missle is to 
be built. In other programs, such ·as the Atlas, the Titan, and the Polaris, 
the best . components currently available on the market have been used~ thus 
attempting to obtain component reliability through a rigorous inspection 
of the parts rised. One of the axioms of the quality assurance field is 
that reliability cannot be inspected into a product, a statement with 
sufficient tru-th· to cause the Minuteman program to be selected by the 
writer as one of the best examples for study in the field today. Let 
us, therefore, look at what is being done in the field of reliability 
with specific emphasis on the Miri.uteman pro~ram. 
CHAPTER . II - THE WAYS OF THE PRESENT 
Design 'Review 
Most logical procedures begin at the beginning of a job and 
carry through to the end. Reliability, unfortunately, has only lately been 
able to achieve this state. Past practices in electronics often led to a 
device being designed and started into production bet' ore the reliability of 
the end product was considered.. This led to the production of items which 
would perform to perfection in the laboratory, but which tended to spend most 
of their time in the field closed down .for repairs. Systems now in use do 
not lend themselves to such practices--it is extrem~ difficult, for instance, 
to replace a .faulty resistor -in a sate.l.lite which is in lunar orbit. In the 
space enviromnent, it became imperative to design systems for r~iability 
l 
.from the very start of the project; therefore, reliability design reviews 
were initiated. What do these reviews accomplish? 
The .first step is the determination of what design trade-of.fs 
shall be na de. Given unlimited weights and unlimited funds, reliability 
apProaching 100 per cent performance would not be too difficult to obtain. 
This is not to be the. case in our era, however; the militarY' puts severe 
restrictions on weight allowances and the civilian market puts limits 
equally as severe on price restrictions. As important in the military 
market a.S weight ·is the sheer bulk of the product be~· designed. If a 
computer is to . .fit within one cubic foot, then certain compromises in 
reliability must be made. 
Maintainability is another item which must be considered in the 
.first design review. That this .factor is sometimes given insufficient 
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attention is attested to by the cl.ll'ses of garage mechanics changir1g spark-
plugs, the moans of aircraft mechanics striv.i.ng to get two hands and a wrench 
through a six-inch engine hatch on a jet airliner, and the shock expressed 
by the home owner when presented with the labor bill for appliance repilis. 
Every system wi11 have its weaknesses; to bury these weaknesses in some 
inaccessible recess is f~lly. 
The definitions of reliability mentioned earlier point out the 
element of time as a limitation to be considered. In the field of military 
electronics, this may be expressed as mission time~· The Minute Man example 
presented earlier covers one extreme of time; another might be the .Arn~y's 
tank destroying rockets, miSsiles, the total functioning life of which is 
measured in seconds. 
Human engineering is another factor now coming into prominence 
in early design trade-offs. Speaking in the broad sense, Murphy''s law 
states that if people can pes sibly cause something to go wrpng; they wi11 
do so. Therefore, the it~s going into a system not onl.y must be per.fection 
of themse1 ves, but they mttst be designed so that people 9annot possibly misuse 
them. 
' The factors heretofore eonsid~red may be regarded as somewhat 
straightforward considerations of our proposed s,ystems•·strengths and 
weaknesses. Now:, how do we eliminate our weaknesses?. The ;New· England 
home with its generator for use when the central electricity is out has 
its counterpart in the electronics field. In circuitry, this function is 
known as duplicate circuitry. We have learned that diodes· ·and transistors, 
while being ranarkable · devices, also have a reliability level lower than 
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that generally desired. Therefore, in certain elements of a circuit, the 
current w:Ul be fed to two d:l.odes instead of just to one.. It is h9ped that 
at least one of these two diodes will work; if one de>es uork, the circuit 
wi.ll function ·correctly. .Unfortunately, the we:l.ght factor mentioned earlier 
enters· very strongly in the field of duplicate circuitry. JU.l these extra 
components add pounds, a price we cannot . afford to pay- at present. 
'What other steps are ther~ to take? Derating of components shows 
itself as a path followed by ~. This technique is as old as the first 
. -
savage who, while· felling a·:- tree across a stream for a makeshift bridge, 
decided to make it a strong tree which would support him and more. This 
early engineer probably used a sa:t"ety faetor of at least 100 per cent, a 
level which seems attractive to our modern design engineer. The circuit · 
designer whenever faced with an application calling for a 1/4 watt resistor 
will invariably use a 1/2 watt resistor. This practice guarantees that, in 
all cases where possible, no component is functioning near its limits ·of 
strength. Safety factors; unfortunately, also have their limits. Here again, 
we .encounter the enelilies of modern packaging--weight and bulk. At some point, 
a compromise must be reached. 
Compromise is the principal purpose of the design review. All 
1ihese factors mentioned and ma:ny others must be taken into consideration to 
design a package of circuitry, an automobile, or a screwdriver. The result 
to be expected is a long run of designs entering production with far fewer 
"bugs n than have been encountered previously. 
Ultra-Reliable Components 
Following the design review, a general idea_ of the system to be ·. · 
obtained is known. The usual course is nO"tv tO make that system as reliable 
•.. . 
as possible within th~ limits of the design •. In military electronic systems, 
. . .. ; 
this usually inv<!>lves the Ptir.chase of components of as high a degree· o:r 
reliability as .possible. How, then, is the reliability of these components 
to be deter.mined? 
The usual standard in use today is mean time between fa:Uure or 
its reciprocal, the failure rate. The failure rate may- be defined as the 
total number ot- failures di:vided by the total Unit ~test hours. In observing 
. . 
the statistics published· by the manufacturers ·of such components, it is well 
to keep in mind that no urii versa;t standard has yet been ~ceepted for pre-
sentation. of such terminoiogy; Thus, the· following statements of failure · 
rates mean exactly the same;. · 
o • .5'%/lOOOhours 
o. 0.5'%/100 hours 
o.oo5 fallures/1000 hours or %/10 h9urs 
o .. 0005%/hours or fallures/100 hours ... 
o.ooooo5 failures/hour 
MTBF=2oo·, ooo. hours . 
The reliability analyst, therefore, is well advised to pay .close atten1:iion. 
to the specifications which he is reading. 
In considering these reliability figures, it is also advisable to ... 
find out the confidence level at which these levels have been. established. 
Most studies made in the past have used a 90 per cent or 9.5' per cent . 
confidence level·in establishing their failure rates. Now:i however, with 
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the stress on ultra-high reliability, we see figures established at lower 
confidence levels, since higher levels would require many months or even 
years o:f testing to prove. The Minuteman program, :for instance, has 
established all o:r its data on a 60 per cent contidence level. While,the 
purist in statistical. techniques might dispute this low level o:r confidence, 
it is costing approximately $200 million to establish the levels which 
~utem~ seeks at a .60 per cent confidence level.5 Since the Minuteman· 
program is one of the best documented now running and since its techniques 
are typical. o:r those being applied throughout the industry, it is well that 
we examine more closely the Minuteman component procurement. 
I 
The Minuteman program is engaged in an attempt to provide a missile 
with extremely high reliability. To achieve reliabil:i.ty in propulsion, the 
missile uses a solid :fuel system. To achieve reliabi.J.j_ty in the electronics 
system, the utmost in ultra-reliable components has been demandede As a 
start, part of the .initial. research and design ;funds was allocated to the 
improvement of component reliability by a :factor of 100~ It was felt that . 
this improvement in reliability could be obtained b1 a thorough stuCO" of aJ.l 
of the variables encountered in the manufacturing process, a caJ.cula:bion . of 
the effects of changing these variables, and the adoption o:r the best methods 
. of production found. To accomplish this, each component supplier had to 
agree to perform .fifteen tasks. These were: 
1. Program plan 
I 
2. Production processes 
3. Production control 
4. Failure ·analysis 
5. Corrective action on production processes 
6. Corrective action on controls 
7. Evaluation o£ corrective action 
~8. Tests 
9. Seller 1 s program organization 
10. Training 
11. Test equipment 
12. Technical direction and monitoring 
13. Serialization 
14. Handling and packaging of devices 
1.5. Documentation and reporting 
Task.l sets forth the seller 1s initial plan for improving the 
reliability of his components. Tasks 2 and 3 require a complete capalog 
of all production processes and documents referring to and controlling 
these processes as used in current production. Task 4 requires the seller 
to establish a group of analysts skilled in all fields relating to the 
component being supplied. This group shall have the responsibil.ity <?f 
analyzing all component failures and suggesting methods for the elimina-
tion of the failure modes concerned. Task 5 requires action on the recom-
mendations made under Task 4. Task 6 requires the establishment of quality 
control procedures to inspect for any new modes of failure found during the 
study. Task 7 demands an evaluation of any correct.i ve action :na de to 
det.erm.ine if, indeed, a correction did t.ake place. Task 8 is designed 
to supply a full amount of background information on all crit.ical 
electrical parameters of the device. This information is to include 
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changes caused by time, failure rates at accelerated environments, and 
appropriate acceleration factors to use to determine failure rates. 
Task 10 requires the seller to maintain training programs in reliability 
at aJ.l levels of' his work force, from the engineering staff' to the hourly 
worker on the production line. Task ll requires the establishment of' 
a list of' special test equipment required to perform the tests used in 
the preceding ta~ks. ·Task 12 allows the buyer to monitor the seller 1s 
pro·duction facilities at any time desired. It aJ.so allows the buyer to 
establish a resident inspector at the plant of' the seller if' desired. 
Task 13 requires that all devices furnished under the contract shall be 
seriaJ.ized, and that·. test data from these seriaJ.ized components shall 
be recorded in such a manner that the data may be used in na chine 
accounting. In practice, most of' this data has been recorded on IBM 
cards. Task 14 describes in detail the method of' packaging to be used, 
and Task 15 describes the types of' reports required in' the program. 
What have these extensive tests and tasks .achieved? The results 
are starting to be seen as some of' the first suppliers to Minuteman are 
announcing attainment of' their goals. .As the program is completed, the 
.; 
·Minuteman will have had an improvement in MTBF from its initial level o:f 
' 
7,000 hours to its goal of' 28,000 hours. Its probability of' success in 
flight will have been raised :from 0.87 to 0.97. Even at a cost of' $20 
million, the program seems to be worth while, since the entire program 
' 
cost will be paid with the elimination o:f :four :flight :failures. The 
effectiveness of .this approach is seen in the :fact that the Minuteman 
bas had far less failures than have the Atlas, Titan, and Polaris 
programs. 
11 
Has the industey ·as a whole gained from this program? The answer 
to this question can be neither a firm :}'yes~L:nor nnon. Some companies 
producing for Minuteman seem to have assimilated little of the data which 
has been gathered. Their Minuteman operation is run as a small separate 
department, while the regular ·production operations which were in existence 
. • l-
before the advent of the Minuteman program are c_ontinuing to work in the 
·same manner they had . eniployed previously. Lessons may have been learned in 
the Minuteman production area, but they are not being applied elsewhere • 
.Another reactio~ to the M:i.D.uteman approach is that of .the comi>any 
which establishes its whole production operation within the requirements of 
·the program and makes changes in the whole product line to reflect any data 
established during tests. 1 This type of vendor feels that his internal problems 
will be simpler if he has 'only one type of production line with which to deal. 
The third approach to the Minuteman reliability proposals is that 
approached by a few fims with an eye for the future electronic component 
business. These firms have established lists of all the parameters of their 
' . . 
products • construction which they desire to study, have used the Minuteman 
contracts to furnish part of these data, and have· paid for the accumulation 
o:f the bal.ance of the data required out of corporate research :funds. These 
firms see themselves not only obtaining the favorable publicity o:r having 
been selected as a Minuteman supplier, but also as establishing themselves 
firmly for the markets of the future by being able to predict the reliability 
of their product · in any sort of environment which it may encounter. 
De~irable though it may seem, the Minuteman approach is used .in only. 
a small portio:p. of OUI' defense work~ The majority of our design engineers are 
still working with whatever components they can obtain on the market. This 
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being the case, what problems do they encounter? 
Problems of Milita.ry Specifications 
Very little that we now consume in life, whether it be a linoleum 
tile for the kitchen floor, a tube for the television set, or a component 
for a missile, is produced without being confined to the limits of some 
government s~ecification. For the items which will be used over a period 
of years, thea$ documents are entirely adequate. In electronics, however, 
much ti"ork is done at a "state of the art" level. For this type of work, 
military specifications have been berated for lateness, incompleteness, 
lack of clarity and lack of feasibility.6 
La~eness is the largest thorn in the flesh of the design engineer 
w~o would use all components approved by militar,y specifications. A reason-
ably competent design engineer could draw up a specification to describe 
almost aey component desired in the space of a day. The government, however, 
takes from a year to eighteen months to process this same specification 
through the corridors of bureaucracy through 'Which it must pass before 
becoming an official MIL SPEC. Therefore, time severely limits the useful-
ness of these specifications. 
Incompleteness is directly related to lateness. Were i~ possible to 
process specifications quickly through government channels, most would be 
adequate. Thle to the delay, however, the engineer decides that he will use 
a specification which vaguely resembles the part he desires, then specify, 
in addition, his own unique requirements. Thus, we see the great majority 
of purchase specifications starting with the phrase, 11This item will be 
constructed to the limits of MIL STD WYZ with the .following exceptions. tt 
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Following this phrase is a list of ten or fifteen items WhiCh need to be 
changed. 
Lack of clarity in anything published by the government has now 
come to be expect.ed •.. Unfortunately, few corporate specificaticul:·"t.,Titers seem 
to be able to improve the situation to any great extent. However, most do 
· £eel compelled to. ~dd some degree of refinement to whatever government 
specifications they are .forced to use~ It is sometimes .felt that many 
government specifications have b"een so compromised· by, the many study groups 
which have designed them that a major rewrite is required just to put teeth 
back into the specification. Sinee the typical. group which writes a speci-
fication for resistors .is- composed primarily of represen1;atives of the various 
resistor manufacturers, this feeling m;q be justified. 
These factors mentioned and others have led to the many eonf'usions 
o.f purchase specifications for· government contracts. Since the various armed 
services realize that most electronic component ·specifications leave muell to 
to be desired, they demand that every item going u;_to a system be covered by 
an approved drawing or specification drawn up by the contractor. In the ease 
of an item unique in the field and used only in one system, this is a prac-
tical. way in which to get a quick specification. However, the military flow 
of. paper work plunges into such detail that a siiUple part used in one hundred 
different systems will have one hundred dif:ferent official drawing numbers 
on :file in the various government purchasing agents concerned. The cost to 
the taxpayer in drafting • time and paper expense can run into the millions of 
dollars 'with ease e-
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'Gorpot"ate Specifications :for Components 
Considering the shortcomings o:f military speci:fications, what is 
the writer of speci:rications in the civilian field to do to overcome these 
shortcomings? The answers to this question are as man:r as there are com-
panies writing specifications for components. 
One of the first decisions that must be made i~ to decide the 
degree of reliability required from the component or Sub-system being ordered. 
In this area, there is :no uniform standard yet aecept~d. · Most orders speci:fy 
mean time between failures. Yet, 'at a national symposium on reliability, 
we hear a speaker saying, ''We are sure tha:li it is obvious that the mean time 
between system failures, although a generally accepted statistical measure 
of reliability, does not tell the :full story about the value of the system 
to its user. n7 Eventually, maintainability of components and sub-systems 
and a comparison of working time, against down-time will probably' become part 
ef the reliability specification. At the present, however, it is seldom 
that one is able to get even a guaranteed failure rate on all compo:nents used 
in a system. 
Given a compoment for use in a system'*:which has a reliability &f 
99.995 per cent, what information does our reliability engineer have? None. 
Other data is necessary before the reliability :figure becomes meaningf'ul. 
First, the confidence level associated with the reliability figure must be 
known. If the vendor of the reliable component only tested two units and 
found them both satisfactory, he could claim his product 100 per cent reliables 
yet, his confidence would be very low. If several thousand units were tested 
without failure over an extended time, then the confidence limits would be 
· high. Therefore, the confidence level. must lie.lmom before the reliability 
figure is meaningful. 
What else must be known abeut this supposedly reliable component? 
We must determ:i.ne,first, the conditions which were tested and, second, the 
amount of drift allowed in these conditions over the test period before the 
r 
component is deelared a parametric .failure. No manufacturer likes to publish 
.figures which show him in an unfavorable light; therefore, the test limits 
have probably been carefully selected by the vendor. 
The corporate speci.f'ication writer can avoid these pit.f'alls by 
writing a complete speei.f'ication which spells out in detail the proven 
reliability required and the tests needed .for ea.ch compdnent. The complaint 
most often heard .from the component manufacturers is that no two corporations 
write the same sort of specification. Thus, the high temperature test cycle 
from one compan:r is set at 1500 C., a second at 200° C. and a third at 225° C. 
Overload tests var,y by similar factors, vibration tests are never the same 
and shock tests often specify machines not owned by the component manufacturer. 
In these instances, a definite need for order is seen, but this order does not 
appear to be forthcoming. Military specifications are available, but, as 
usual, are unclear. The aystem manufacturer is informed that his system, all 
the sub-systems in his system and all the components in his system must 
conform. to a certain ennromnental specification. The system manufacturer 
attempts to hold his component vendors to this speci.f'ication, but promptly is 
told that this specification applies only to equipment, not to components and 
provisions o.f' the specification are impossible. The system manufacturer is 
then forced to get ag.re~ent from the govermnent on certain component environ-
mental requirements. In the meantime, the reliability staff is hoping that the 
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requirements will be such that past data on component reliability collected 
by the vendor will still be valid. 
CHAPTER III - EQUIPMENT RELIABTI.ITY 
Reliability Estimate· 
In previous chapters, we have discussed the current methods of 
approach in determining the reliabUity o:r electronic components; the basic 
building blocks of all electronic systems Blld missile guidance units. In 
evaluating components, techniques of estimation have been established which 
are relatively free of controversy. In establishing the reliabUity of 
systems, no uniform method of approach has yet been determined. What can 
be done with the, information now available to the miss:Ue designer? 
The first step is an estimate of equipment reliability. The reli-
ability engineer must consider all the componen:ts used in his s;yStem. He 
must consider the loading of these components, wether they a re to be used 
a.~;' full power or part power. He must m nsider any possible duplication of 
function as discussed earli~r under design review. Finilly, the designer 
must consider. the environment under which the system is. designed to operate. 
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Is it to be in a laboratory, in a. submarine, in a missile, or in a satellite. 
Each of these applications will have its own peculiarities and restrictions, 
but mueh work al.reaey has been done to define these peculiarities. The manu-
facturers of the major missiles have made studies of conditions involved in 
space operations and the rocket environment and have furnished criteria by 
which to de-rate the components being used. The government has given cont;racts 
to various private research organizations~ such as ARINC to stu~ actual 
satellite failures and assign a probable cause to each fa:Uure, thus giving 
a further . stu~ of :failure r~tes in the outer space environment.. All. o:f 
these studies and reports are o:r great aid in the initial establishment o:f 
a reliabUi ty e.stimate .. 
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Proof of Reliability 
After the estimate of reliabUity is established comes the proof' 
',. ·. 
of' reliability'. Proof' :ut:a:.r be obtained in several ways, the method selected 
depending largely on the size and end use of' the product being considered. 
Items for non-critical .gro-und use may be produced on the basis of' the 
reliability estimate alone. In these applications, equipment failure :is o:r 
no major importance, since repairs may be made readily. At the other extreme 
in reliability testing will be those units. designed for rocket or space 
applications. In these applications, whole guidance systems will be assembled · 
and put through thousands of hours o:f electrical tests be:fore the first system 
is flown in a missile. otbar units· wiJ.l be operated while being exposed to 
extremes of vibration, shock, temperature and humidity approximating or 
exceeding those conditions to be seen by the missile in its use • 
. Here, ~ain, cost becomes a large :factor in the picture, and a 
factor which must be considered carefully. Both overspend.:i.J:lg and under-
spending must be avoided. Consider. a case in which the Air Force placed 
an order for three grot.md use generators. To have fulfilled the reliability 
requirements specified on the original draft of the order, the equipment manu-
facturer would have had to test six generators to destruction. This is clearly · 
an example of oversp~nding. On the other hand, when we have another missile 
failure at Gape Canaveral, it is often a case of underspending--the use of' a 
component not yet fully proven for instance. 
A much used compromise· in the field of equipment reliability is 
that of sub-system tests. When it is impraCtical or impossible to test a 
whole system (eonsider, for example, a one hundred feet high and three hund:f.ed 
feet long radar antenna with its accompanying electronic devices), it is of.ten 
quite possible to teat smaller elements of the system. A computer m~ 
be tested, for instance, or a rocket motor, all without the tremendous 
expense of a missile shoot. Then, instead of combining component failure 
rates to obtain system reliability, the reliability engineer may fi:rid 
that it is far easier to combine sub-system reliability data to obtain 
a final system figure. This is probably the most practical approach to 
·consider. 
Field Failure Reporting 
Most of our complex modern syste,ns, therefore, rely on the reli-
ability estimate of their performance which was prepared before the system 
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· was actually produced. These figures are only theoretical; the actual reli-
ability figures will b.e obtained from field failure information. This is 
· leaning on a weak system, since, in many cases, firms have found that £ield 
£ailure reports do not accurately report equipment operating time before 
failure, provide incomplete and/or invalid failure data, misinterpret the 
data and, in general, report the data on such a wide diversity of £ormats 
that data'interpretation is extremely dif£icult. 8 Inefficient though 
present reporting systems may be, they still give some of the most valuable 
data obtainable. Here the cOmponents and the systems are out of the artifi-
. cial environment of the test and into actual use. From these reports, the 
reliability engineer will be able to draw his first figures to show how 
good a unit has been produced. From this data also will come the in£or-
mation which will t.ell what changes must be made in future systems, what 
components have proven themselves, and what components must be replaced. 
Field failure reporting is one of the most important steps in our current 
search for more and better failure rate information, and a step which 
should be improved greatly.· steps for this :improvement will be dis-
cussed in Chapter VI. 
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CHAPTER IV - CORRECTIONS FOR THE PRESENT 
Private Industry - Changes in Current Practices 
· Despite the efforts of some firms to ignore all attempts to 
improve reliability; despite the efforts of the firms which will offer only 
their old dependable product and guarantee nothing more; despite those firms 
which declare that no agency, be it from one of their customers or from one· 
of the armed services, has any right to inspect their processes and product 
in the making; despite all these, reliability requirements will become a part 
of contract specifications in the near fUture. How near this future is to 
us, we can only gw!ss. Some contracts now require ::reliability estimates as 
part o.f their requirements and some very few require proof of reliability. 
This start is a sure sign o.f things to come. We previously" have described 
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the current practices in reliability., including some of' their short-comings. 
Let us now consider what actions seem necessary if private industry is to con-
tinue to advance in producing a more reliable product. 
The design review discussed earlier has proven to be a satisfac-
tory tool, but improvements could be maqe in its implementation. Too often, 
these reviews are conducted in a manner which tends to exclude representatives 
o.f the quality assurance function. This exclusion is unwise, since the quality 
assurance men are usua}.ly those \best qualified to ~bitrate between the some-
times idealistic concept of the design engineer and the loose tolerance 
demands of the production managers. B.r this modification, the utility o.f the 
. review can be increased greatly. 
The ultra-reliable component is dealt with in great detail in the 
Darnell Report and will be discussed quite extensively in Chapter V. The 
Darnell committee was selected by the Department of Defense for the express 
purpose of' developing a method of obtaining the most reliable components 
possible and making sure that these desired levels of reliability were con-
tinued during all production. This connni ttee •s plans are still far from 
adoption. How is the manufacturer who is se:I.ecting parts to be used in the 
present time to deal with this situation? His first consideration should be 
given to whatever data is available. If some firms publish reliability data 
for their components, this data must be considered carefully, bearing in mind 
the different methods by which this data m~ be presented as discussed pre-
viously. What if no data is available from the vendor? The buyer is still 
not without some information--he may have purchased items from the vendors 
concerned and have past incoming inspection records for their p;- oducts. 
These will give at least some indication of the type of outgoing quality 
controls maintained by the vendor. If there is no past history available 
within the company, there may be some information available on data exchange 
reports issued by some of the missile programs. Such information as is 
available is usually issued in the form of IDEP reports, reports 'Which are 
available throughout the industry. If no reports whatever are available, 
it may be desirable to purchase units for the sole purpose of running 
performance tests on them, thus giving some concrete information on compo-
nent life expectancy. 
Even if extensive test information is available, it is most 
advisable for the buyer to spend the time and money for a physical inspec-
tion of the vendor's facilities. Often these visits can bring about a com-
plete change of opinion regarding the vendor's capabilities. The vendor 
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may be found to have poor internal controls, his facilities may be inadequate 
.tor the .volume ot purcl:uises. contemplated by the investigator, or the vendor 
may have most of his production allocated to one purchaser, a £actor which 
.could cause little or no consideration to be given to a new customer. An 
actual visit to a proposed vendor also will establish a personal acquaintance 
between members of the two concerned organizations, a relationship Which will 
be .of no mean value in the exchange of ideas. The time and effort spent 
in an adequate program of vendor evaluation will be more than repaid by 
the reduction in the costs of obtaining reliability .:2:: 
. . 
After the selection of vendors tor components is· finished, the 
manufacturer then must exercise careful control over his internal assembly 
and inspection practices. This is. not a new concept; it has been a require-
ment .for good manufacturing since the first wheel was produced, yet we still 
find gaps in control procedures which allow gross defects to slip through the 
manufacturing area. How else can we explain the missing parts, the units 
'Which obviouslyneverhave been operative? A well planned internal inspec-
tion program should make several contributions to the reliability program. 
At incoming inspection, data should be collected which will indicate the 
vendor's compliance with the vendor's reliability estimates or guarantees. 
In process inspections may well contribute information regarding component 
failure rate mder continuing test. Final inspections furnish the manufac-
turer with the vital parameter and failure information needed for him to 
make his own guarantees of .failure rate and unit tolerances. For a:n.y of 
this information to be valid, records must be kept in sufficient detail to 
indicate the effect o:f any manufacturing changes, any substitution ot 
components, or . any change in methods of inspection. The reliability data thus 
gathered must then be evaJ.uated and, most important o:f all, be made known 
to those concerned with the product. 
How, the manufacturer asks, is he to publish reliability data when 
there is yet to be establishe~ a uniform method o:f presentation o:f this data? 
The 90 per cent confidence level using MIL STD 202 test methods presented 
· ~ the Darnell Report would seem to o:f:fer the best solution. At this point 
in time, however, the method o:f presentation is o:f lesser importance than the ~: 
:fact that data must be collected. If raw data is available, it can be converted 
into any of a multitude o:f methods of presentation. Texas Instruments, :for 
instance, advises its customers that· they have data on file and, i:f the 
customer ·will define the parameters in which he is interested, they will 
make an. IBM run o:f the data to :furnish the information which he desires,. 
Many other :firms state that they have raw data on :file and are waiting :for 
a method o:f presentation to be extablished. With this in mind, no manu-
facturer who wishes to remain in the military market can afford to waste 
any opportunity to gather meaOing:ful reliability information. 
While it is the prime responSibility o:f the military to establish 
standards :for the presentation of reliability data, private industry can 
h<:!-Ve a large say in the type o:f standards that are established.. By working 
through trade groups, much could be accomplished. However, these groups 
have proven to be as slow moving as the military in the past, slowed down 
· to the pace o:f individual firms trying to protect their own product or position. 
In the trade associations and professional societies, industry has a powerful 
tool to use for standardization, but the w:lll to use the tool must be aroused 
before it can become effective. I.f private industry wishes to avoid ·dictation 
by the military, immediate action is jmperative. Reliability studies will be 
made, they must be made, they must be meaningful ~d they must 'be specific. 
Accelerated Life Tests 
Both component and eqUipment manufacturers and the armed services 
have voiced complaint~ about the enormous time and expense necessary to 
prove a component or system has the degree o.f reliability necess~ .for space 
age use. These complaints could be stilled if a valid method of correlation 
of short term test data with long ter.m reliability could be established. To 
·date, this has not been done. Preliminary efforts have been made in the .field 
o.f capacitors by such .firms as Corning and Vitramon. What is their reaction 
to such tests? E. A. Bolton o.f Vi tramon states, "Although the investment in 
time and money necess~ to complete such a program will be high, it is anti-
cipated that all component manufacturers will utilize this type o.f program. rrl() 
Bolton's statement, however, should be considered in the light o.f the .fact that· 
a close correlation has been found between accelerated li.fe tests and long term 
li£e in capacitors with a~elatively small amount o.f effort being expended. 
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There still have been no adequate criteria established for other components 
or for completed systems'. However, as Mr. Bolton states, while the initial 
costs of such investigations will be high, the net result will be a great 
reduction in the long te~ cost of establishing component reliability. 
How can such accelerated test criteria be established? The methods 
currently in use involve operating units at voltages in ·excess of that for which 
they are rated, operating at eXtremely high or low temperatures and operating 
under various combinations of these conditions. The results obtained from 
these tests are correlated in a matrix stuey of component performance and 
an attempt is made to find critical failure indications. It is these definite 
indications of failure which now are lacking fer most components and which 
are being sought by' industry. When these criteria for ~arly prediction o£ 
failure are found, they niu.st be accepted for all similar components £or the 
study to be o£ lasting value. Only by the use o£ such techniques may the 
cost of reliability studies £or components or systems be materia.ll.y reduced. 
CHAPTER ·. VJ. - :BLUEPRIWC- FOR: THE FUTURE 
Task Assigmnent 
Perhaps, the most significant work done in recent Je ars to improve 
component reliability is the research done by the Ad Hoc study Group on Parts 
Specifications Management for Reli~ility under the auspices of the Office of 
the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the Office of the Assist-
ant Secretary o! Defense (Supply ~d Logistics). The two volume report of the 
group, Parts Specification Managenient for Reliability, has been the center of 
. 
controversy ever since its publication in Mq, 1960. The report is known as 
the Darnell Report from the committee 1s chairman, Paul S. Darnell. Let us 
first consider the official task assignment • 
. Increasingly more complex electronic equipments demanding 
high reliability have created the need for additional re-
quirements in the parts and tubes specifications. The 
specifying of reliability in quantitative terms requires the 
introduction of reliability requirements into both equipment 
and component spe~i.fications as well as the development of 
practical and economical test procedures to verif,y compliance 
with the specifications. In addition, quality control pro-
cedures should include features to insure maintenance of 
reliability levels· throughout production runs. 
To enable designers to develop equipments which will meet 
qUantitative specification of reliability for equipments and 
systems it is essential; that design guidance and application 
data such as oom.ponent failure rates as a function of time 
and environment be made available to engineering groups. 'l.'b.ere 
is a great need to obtain and disseminate these techinical char-
acteristios of components as quickly as possible. 
In the i:d:. erests of economy, procedures must be designed . and 
developed Which will avoid duplication of aooeptance tests. 
The basic objective of the study was ttto analyze the recom-
mendations established by the AGREE Task Group 5 in order to 
advise the Assistant Secretaries of Defense (R&E) and (S&L) 
regarding efficient implementation methods and procedures. 
The following were ;included: 
(a) Recommend criteria and methods for specifying the 
reliability of parts and tubes in terms of failure rate 
as a function of time, environment and circuit applica-
tion severity~ 
(b) Survey- the methods used in preparation of parts ·and 
tubes specifications as well as coordination proced~es 
and practices. This survey shall be :pta.de to suggest 
changes which would accommodate the specifi¢ation ef 
reliability level and its allied reliability assurance 
requirements~ Procedures proposed shall be to enhance 
rapid and full specification coordination within the 
Mil.itary Departments and with industry. 
(c) Review. of Qualified Products List (QPL) and Quali-
fication Tes-eing Procedures .to evaluate: (1) If qualifi-
cation is being properly :implemented. (2) Adequacy of 
tests w.tth respect to the reliability requirements and 
quality contNl procedures included in the specification. 
(3) Provisions for avoiding any duplication· of Qualifica-
tion Testing by various contractors. 
(d) Recommend reliability assurance test procedures to 
verify compliance with the reliability level specified. 
' 
(e) Recommend a program and methodology for obtaining 
technical characteristics and test data of parts includ-
ing failure rate data and the procedure for making this 
data available to designers and logistics personnel. 
(f) Investitate the need for a document. other than the 
specification . to provide design guide information such 
as parts and tube application c1r ves (including failure 
rate curves or data as a .:funotion of circuit application 
severity level md environment). Such a document would 
provide design guide information as opposed to the firm 
specification requirement data mentioned above. 11 · 
With these assignments being handed out to a group in 19.58, ene 
would think mamy of the problems of componen~s mentioned earlier in the 
report would be near solution. However, it took about two years for the 
committees to meet and dete_rmine their recommended courses of action. 
Considering the scope of this investigation and the difficulty in assembling 
groups scattered about the country, this is not too poor a performance record. 
What, then, were the recommendations made? 
First, the Darnell report recol!lDlended the establishment within the 
Department of Defense o.f a group to manage electronic parts spec~ications. 
All specifications wouJ.d be funneled through this one agency-; it would control 
priorities in writing of sp·eoi.fications, review ·the writing being done to 
assure adhera:nce to schedule and make certain that all specifications could 
be used by all services. In short, .for the .first time, a centralized control 
o:f specifications would be established, a control which would be superior to 
the three purchasing services, not subservient to them. 
After establishing a central control group :for specifications, 
what next? The problem. o:f measured reliability was first attacked. The 
approaCh used was based on the premise that reliability measured on a lot to 
lot basis would be prohibitively expensive. Despite this, reliability data 
could be gathered at not too great an expense if a long period of production 
runs and tests v·as considered on arry given item or :family o.f items. What 
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level of confidence should be sought? The Darnell connnittee recommended the 
90 per cent level. They :felt that all component manufacturers should gather 
reliability data and establish whatever rate was possible at a 90 per cent 
con:fidence level. The manu:facturer would then continue to gather data and 
announce improved reliability levels as they were obtained. The committee 
:felt that the initial established level and the levels of 1, 0.1, 0.01 and 
0.001 per cent per 1,000 hours would be sufficient.. Conditions under which 
the test data was gathered would be specified and :fGr th~ :first time, the 
system designer would have a :full listing of the reliability capabilities e.f 
the components· which he planned to use. 
Even the format in 'Which the listing of the qualified vendor was 
made was to be new and different. The armed services had had qualified vendor 
lists for years, yet these lists had little meaning. Most interpreted these 
lists as being records of firms which, at some time in the past, had pro-
duced one lot of an item -which had passed the gevermnent qualif'ication.. No 
great faith was placed in these lists except that m~ government contractors 
were forced to purchase from the listed vendors. Now, the Darnell report was 
recommending that the. qualified v~ndor list be made meaningful; that the list 
include not just the vendor's name, but the gua:oanteed reliability level at 
which the parts were being produced. This would give th~ buyer the choice 
of a firm which could guat;imtee .0.1 per. cent reliability or one which could 
guSl!antee 0.01 per cent reliability. 
The wheels have been set in motion--the specification written, the 
method of determining reliab;U~t.y selected. 'Who, now, t~ to police the 
operation of the system? Here we have the first appearance of that much 
maligned character, the gover~ent inspector. Hear a few typical complaints 
on government monitoring of inspecti~. 
1. "Government;souree' inspection ••• does not give us muCh 
assurance that a specific part meets requirements to which it 
was purchased. n 
2. "Utility questionable ••• we will 100 per cent or sample 
test all items received even though items have been government 
source inspected .. u 
). "For the most part, Source Inspection provides little or no 
material benefits. to the contractor." 
4~~ nLimitation of effectiveness is imposed by the technical 
capability of the monitoring pers«i>nnel. 11 
5. ttThe government would be farther ahead by employing fewer, 
'iDlore intelligent and better educated' inspectors. tt12 
These indictments, perhaps, overstate the· case against the 
govermnent inspector, yet 'there are some very legitimate complaints against 
some government inspect0rs. The Darnell report has its suggested cures for 
this situation. In the first place, the responsibility for the purchase of 
reliable components and the guarantee of their quality will rest with the 
purchaser. It is rightly his responsibility to inspect these incoming items 
to insure their conformande to specification. To aid the purchasers of 
components, the govermnent inspectors should be trained in the characteristics 
of the device or devices which they are inspecting and the strengths and weak-
nesses of the test equipment being used. Some training Bl.so should be given 
in statistical. techniques, s0 theLinspector will be a better judge of the 
methods of inspection employed. Thus, while responsibility for incoming 
inspection will rest with 'the purchaser of components, a well- trained staff 
of government inspectors will aid in supplying better parts to inspect. 
We have seen here recommendations to aid· specification drawing, 
reliability measurements from test data, qualified vendor lists and government 
source inspection. The pa.i'ts have now been delivered to the user. Does data 
collection stop here? Not at all. Failure rate data collected heretofore has 
been on components performing in carefully controlled laboratory conditions, 
the sort of atmosphere which they will not encounter in field use. To aid 
in the interpolation of this data into meaningful reliability figures for 
the various· environments which the components may encounter, the Darnell 
report would organize a central data collecting agency which would receive 
information of field failures and would list these failures in relation te 
the environment in which they occurred. Thus, reliability levels eventually 
would be established for many ?-evels of stress. A compoment would have one 
failure rate if used in the laboratory, another if used in mobile equipment 
and another if used in a rocket. One failure rate would: be established if 
the component is used at rated load, another rate if the compenent is de-
rated by one third, and another rate if the component is derated by one half. 
When this level of recording is reached, all firms using electronic components 
will benefit greatly. Some industry exchange of data exists now; the Battelle 
Memorial Institute acts as a clearing h0il.se .for data exchange between several 
.firms which have entered its program. Co-operation also exists between groups 
of firms supplying the same missile program. Titan, .for instance, has an 
active data exchange system. Darnell's committee hopes to extend this method 
of exchange throughout the entire industry. 
The program outlined in the Darnell report is a comprehensive pro-
gram and, being comprehensive, it is also expensive. This high cost of inves-
tigating reliability levels has led the committee to recommend a severe restric-
tion in the style and types of standard reliable parts to be investigated. 
Prime system contractors would then be forced to make the maximum possible use 
of the parts so tested and, as far as possible, design their systems around 
these units. 
In these last preceding pages, we have seen a rough outline of a 
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program covering completely the field of component reliability. Its recom-
mendations are practical and, if used as the committee has suggested, not too 
costly for the ends which are sought. What has been industry reaction to 
this approach? On the surface, apathy is dominant. Few firms wish te spend 
their own money deve1. oping this type of data and the few that have started 
giving guaranteed reiiability figures have been disappointed in the sales 
reaction obtained by the figures. Most system manufacturers continue to bU7 
from their old suppliers and the armed services, so far, have refused to put 
pressure on the system manufacturers to change policies. The services fear 
being caught with a single supplier for a vital component; therefore, they 
hope to wait for several firms in any one field to offer proven reliabUity 
before forcing this sort of purchasing on the military~trade. 
Despite the surface apathy, much data is bei.Bg collected. Typical, 
perhaps, is a case of a five-year stu~ of transistor characteristics by 
General Electrio.1 03 While General Electric has published the results of its 
stu~, :m.a.J.\Iy' other studies have been made which are not yet available. Most of 
these will be published :immediately after Darnell report recommendations become 
offiei:al government requirements. 
Component Specifications-
The recommendations of the Darnell Report form an excellent basis 
for military improvement of component. reliability.. Whether this specific 
report is used as a basis fer future specifications is imm~teriaJ.; what is 
important is the· need for more government direction ..in the writing or speci-
fications. These specifications must be meaningful; to be meaningful, they 
must be able to refle~ the ou.rrent state of the art of component man't2facturing. 
To reflect the state of the art, the specifications lllUSt be quick to appear 
after a device is developed and approved for use. A reasonable time for a 
specification to spend between inception and publication wuld seem to be six 
months; an;r period of time longer than this penalizes the government to the 
extent that it is not allowed to use the most modern devices available on the 
market. Immediate action, therefore, should be taken to implement a program 
of this sort. 
To establish meaningful specifications, rel.iability requirements 
must be included. It will be impossible to establish reliability specifica-
tions using the -present hodge-podge of reporting procedures at use in the 
field. A start toward s;tandardization has been made by the RIQUAP program; 
a method of establishing . a plant 's qua]J.ty level and then allowing products 
so qualified to be shipped with a reduced sampling inspection.1h The Reduced 
Inspection Qu.ali ty Assurance Plan has had onl:y" l:imi. ted ·acceptance to date; 
many firms obje_ct t& the stringent government inspection required. From the 
long-term viewpoint, the scope of this program is not wide enough to cover the 
type of reliability data required. Here again, the government Jll'Q.St take the 
initiative and establish uniform mathematical concepts £or computing 
. . 
reliability data and a unifor.m reporting procedure £or comparison and 
recording o£ this data. Industry can give reconnnendations :f0r these prac-
tices and should be solicited :for ~dvice, but the government mu.st remain the 
:final arbiter to decide the techniques to be employed. 
Duplication o£ Effort 
As we observe: the increased emphasis on reliability, the waste 
involved in this stress quickly becomes evident. A new device is presented to 
the market and immediately a score or more companies start evaluation programs 
on the device's effectiveness. Test racks and :fixtures are designed, equip-
ment purchased and thousands o:f engineering run-hours are expended to check 
the operating characteristics and li:fe expectancy o:f one item. Who pa;rs this 
cost? At least 90 per cent o:f the time, the burden is borne by one o:f the armed 
services. This leads to such extremes as the Air Foree paying Autonetics to 
evaluate a component :for Minuteman, paying General DYnamics to evaluate the 
same component :for the Atlas program and paying the Martin Company to evaluate 
the component yet a third time :for its installation in Titan. Are the uses 
di:f:ferent? In most cases, they are not. The.three instances cited above all 
are missile programs; all will have somewhat s:imUar operating environments and 
all are very costly. Were the applications to be dissimilar in use, li:fe, load 
or environm.ent, then additional test programs would be justified. to study the 
unknown areas. Even in this variety o:f environments, however, the unkno-wn is 
shrinking rapid:cy". studies by the Martin Company- have developed mathematical 
conversion :factors by the use o:f which laboratory tests can be converted to 
expected li:fe in any one o:f a variety o:f environments, such as truck mounted 
equ:i.pment, propellor aircraft, jet aircraft 0r rockets.~ Therefore, it 
vrould seem that if the services would have one center for the collection 
and distribution of test data, a great deal of waste could be trimmed from 
our defense budget. 
' Duplication of effort does not occur only in the writing of speci-
fications and in the testing of components. Another great waste of manpower 
occurs in the multit1lde 0f government inspectors with whom. the country is 
blessed. It is not uncommon for a component manufacturer to have government 
inspectors visit him from the Air Force, from several d.jfferent branches G)f 
the Navy and from the Ar:my Signal Corps. In theory, we ha-ve a unified Depart-
ment of . Defense, In actual practice, the services are still very much separate. 
It is only grudgingly that one service will allow another to inspect its pur-
chases; indeed, we occasionally see different branches of the same service 
demanding separate inspection policies. The Darnell report called attention to 
the rather low level of some government inspection; surely' a more competent 
inspection could be made for the same expenditure ii' this needless service 
ri va.J.r:r were eliminated. Here is a case of hir~g large numbers of marginally 
qualified inspectors. Should the duplication be eliminated and well-trained 
engineers be selected as government inspectors, the services would have more. 
assurance of receiving a high qb.ality product than they now have. Due to the 
ver:r deliberate speed with which the wheels d£ gpvernment roll, this suggestion 
for improvement must be one marked to take place over a span. of several. :years. 
None of these suggestions for the improved reliability of components 
are radical changes to existing pol:icies. They are, rather, a hasten:ing of the 
natural sort of evolut:ion one would expect current polic:ies to follow, were they 
run by an aggressive private corporation. Running all branches of a business 
in the same manner, elimination of waste and duplication and an orderly manner 
of recordkeeping are the sort C!>f basic business principles taught. to thousands 
of freshmen every September. It will be unfortunate, indeed, if the armed 
services find it impossible to app~ these principles to their operations. 
System Reliability 
As is the ease with component manufacture, one of the first objec-
t 
tives in system manufacture should be the establishment of a common language 
of reliability. , Failure rates and.fail.ures must be defi.f<led; a commonl.y 
accepted confidence level must be determined. It is di:r:fieult for the statis-
tician to evaluate severaJ. systems using the same sort of reliability data. 
. -
Visualize,; then, the confusion of some of our untrained . ~ongressiona1 and 
military Z.epresentatives in trying to evaluate several systems presented in 
widely d:i:fferent manners. A uniform system of reliability prediction is, 
therefore, a neeessar.r first step to allow a fast, aecur~te comparison of 
performance of various systems. 
Another .factor which the armed services must consider .. and, perhaps, 
reconsider is the practice of awarding contracts almost sole~ on a price basis. 
Price is important, but performance cannot be overlooked. The fir.m 'Wi.th rela-
tively' few scruples can always make a low bid on a contract, planning to 
recover their initial calculated loss on the frequent changes in specification 
to "Which every government contract is subject. Therefore, it would benefit the 
contract administrator to study previous contracts awarded to low bidders. Were 
the previous predicted reliability levels met? Were the units free of trouble? 
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Were the costs to the government of Changes excessively high? After a con-
sideration of this sort of data, an agency might find that it would be unwise 
to offer an item to a low bidder since costs after the awarding of the contract 
frequently may outweigh any initial savings. Even in government buying, we 
usually get what we pay for. 
Whether the purchased items be components or systsns, the government 
in the .for.m of the armed services cannot and must not shirk its responsibilities 
as the controller. of the purchasing and design policies of the many firms 
supplying .federal contracts. These services are the only agencies with the 
power to establish uniformity by decree--it seems past time that the,y do so. 
Government-Industry Liaison 
How is the government to establish these somewhat rigid specifica-
tions without arousing the wrath of all industry? There is no clear-cut 
answer to this problem, but techniques can be suggested. Previous govern-
ment and industry committees for the establishment of specifications have 
had a large share of their members .from firms producing the components 
concerned. These are intelligent men working hard to do their job, yet 
company bias easilym~ creep into an official specification. These 
committees would have a better chance of good performance if the specifi-
cation writers for components might, instead of being drawn .from the com-
ponent manufacturers' be drawn from the system manufacturers' where less 
prejudice may have developed. The representatives of those f:irms directly 
''-. 
affected by the specification should be allowed to participate on the 
committee only as advisors, not as voting members. B.f thus selecting 
committee members for specification writing, the government could avoid 
some bickering .and any claim of prejudice in favor of one manufacturer or 
group of manufacturers. 
There will always be some complaints, regardless of the tech-
nique used by government to establish specifications. However,· complaints 
are far less numerous once a degree of confidence has been established 
in the competence of the party with whom dealings are made. If the Depart-
ment of Defense should show the competence in writing specifications desired 
by private industi-;r, little friction. would take place• 
Field Failures - More A.ecurate Reporting 
Finally, how are we to improve the fiow of in:f> rmation on field . 
failures to the manufacturer of the failed component or system? The first 
requirement should be for the user of any pieces of complex military equip-
ment to keep an operational log of the amount of hours the .equipment has 
been in use. This is standard procedure on such pieces of hardware as 
airplanes and helicopters; it would require merely an extension of such a 
log system to indicate the hours of operation of a radar set or a computer 
system. Time is the matter of primary interest on such . a log; of secondary 
interest irould be such items as temperature, humidity, and other items 
which may have an effect on the life of the system being considered. 
The second phase of field faililre analysis must be an adequate 
informed estimate of the cause for the equipment 'becoming non-operative. 
In some ststems, we may find something as simple to locate as a tube which 
has failed because of age; in another system we my be able to 'brace the 
cause of failure only to a certain sub-system. This sort of failure 
, .. 
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analysis often ~equires the work of a highly skilled technician. The 
price of such skilled help must be paid, however, since faulty failure 
reports placing incorrect blame for failure are worse than no reports at al.l. 
Once the guilty component or sub-system has been found during ini-
tial failure analysis, the more exacting study of finding out why a given 
component has failed begins. The failure may have been random, or it 
may have been an indication of something wrong during manufacture. An 
error in manufacture may cause a certain period of production from a 
given vendor "to come under suspicion. If high failure rate items are 
detected, similar items in field use may be replaced by satisfactor.r 
components before actual failure takes place. 
Field failures often are the first indication of weaknesses in 
a production item which have not become apparent during laborator,r tests. 
A civilian counterpart of this sort of failure would be the fan belt 
troubles of the early Corvairs.; Military equipment may be found with 
similar shortcomings, and may be corrected,, as was the Corvair, by retro-
fitting more adequate components. 
Analysis of the sort discussed in these paragraphs will require 
much more work than is now being performed. Faulty components must be 
shipped to their manufacturer, instead of being scrapped as is now done. 
Users of the faulty components must satisfy themselves that corrective 
actions based on the information in field failure reports has been taken. 
Only by following these steps can field failure reporting fulfill its 
potentialities as a correction device for component manufacturing. 
A question still remains as to the proper method of distributing 
field failure information throughout the nation's great number of potential 
users of such data. With our new and sophisticated computers, even this 
task will probably diminish to manageable proportions once the mechanisms 
for the collection of such data have been established. If this central 
information agena,y functions as desired, we will have given component 
· manufacturers the information they need to improve their components and 
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the system manufacturers the information they need to select the most reliable 
component available, thus aiding the whole: industry on to a new ear of 
improved reliability. 
As this has been written, Colonel Glenn has completed his orbital 
voyage safely and reliability seems to have been adequate. However, before 
Colonel Glenn began his epic journey, a bolt had to be replaced. As he 
re-entered the earth's atmosphere, a signal failed to operate. This indicates 
that even in a program of this importance to the country, the execution of the 
reliability requirements for the syst~ allowed discrepant material to be 
installed in the space capsule. As I began the study which led to the writing 
of this report, I -was convinced that much of the money being spent on reli-
ability was a complete waste; that a good product oould be achieved by rigid 
adh.erance to sound manufacturing principles. As I completed the study', m;r 
conviction had changed. I now believe that not enough time or money is 
invested in improving reliability of product for eithei'':- the civilian or mili-
tary market. That there is waste and duplication of effort in our current 
programs cannot be denied; however, the criticism here is not of the progress 
being applied, but of the over:-all management of these programs. My own 
recommendations are for a program of standardization of approach and an 
elimination of duplication of effort as detailed in the preceding pages. In 
these recommendations, I believe most of industry would concur. The best 
sunnnation of our present position and our future prospects is this: "American 
industry is about to wage war against unreliability • • • but our records at 
Cape Canaveral shmil' that 100 per cent reliability is still a long way off. nl7 
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